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I
NATURE OF THE QUESTION
For a long time it has been a dogma admitted by the jurists of all
countries that a contract alone could create consensual legal relations
between individuals, in the absence of an express provision of the law
assimilating, by way of exception, a unilateral act to a contract. On
the other hand, it has been admitted with equal unanimity that when-
ever several concurrent declarations of will occur, a contract exists
If the unilateral act produces legal effects in the domain of public
law the reason was said to be that it emanates from a person invested
with public power;- but even in the matter of public law, when the
public power does not appear in the foreground, a contract alone can
create consensual legal relations; and in this field also there is a con-
tract whenever there is a concurrence of will.
In the course of the last twenty-five years a double evolution has
taken place in ideas and facts; the facts have acted on the ideas and
the ideas on the facts. The. question has been asked what was the
value in law of this notion of public power which, under the persisting
influence of Roman conceptions, has for centuries been declared to be
an indispensable and intangible postulate. It was recognized that this
notion was neither more indispensable nor more intangible than many
others which had long been so considered. It was further recognized
that in order to understand how a unilateral act emanating from
governments or their agents can produce legal effects, it is useless to
admit the postulate of public power, and that its creative force is
not explained through the hypothesis of an imperium, but solely
through the conformity of the act to the objective law of the social
group in which it occurs. If a unilateral declaration of will which
conforms to the objective law may of itself produce a legal effect in
the domain of public law, there is no reason why the same should not
be true in the domain of private law.
We have thus been led to inquire whether there are not in private
law many acts, hitherto considered as contractual, which in reality are




only unilateral acts, and to which in consequence the ordinary law of
contracts should not be applied.
On the other hand, numerous cases have appeared in the domain of
public law, internal as well as international, where there is a concur-
rence of wills and where nevertheless one has a distinct feeling that
there is no contract. For example, in countries in which legislation
proceeds from the concurrence of the wills of two chambers or of such
chambers and a chief magistrate, it cannot be said that there is a con-
tract between the chambers or between the parliament and the chief
magistrate. It is likewise clearly seen that the official acts of a cor-
porate agency are not per se contracts. Finally, in certain acts based
perhaps upon agreement, such as the appointment of a public officer,
or the granting of a franchise for a public service, one may see this
less clearly, but the impression certainly is that it would be taking a
false view to see therein contracts of the classical and professional
type.
The observations made in the domain of public law have led naturally
to the inquiry whether in private law also there were not many cases in
which there exists a concurrence of wills, and in which nevertheless
it cannot be said that there is a contract in the traditional and civilian
sense of the word. We were forced to recognize that such was the
case. But the habit was so strong, the tradition had become so deeply
encrusted in our minds, that it was impossible for a while-at least in
France-to discard the notion of a contract. We desired to maintain
the thing and the word, but we added to the word epithets which,
although we did not see it, were inconsistent with it. We spoke of
contracts of adhesion, of collective contracts-expressions which con-
tain a contradiction in adjecto.
Facts and ideas progress, however, notwithstanding the opposition
of jurists adhering to tradition, and the time has come for us to
recognize that in the domain of private law as in that of public law
there is a series of cases in which, although there is a concurrence of
wills, it cannot be said that there is a contract. It does not suffice,
however, for us to arrive at a negative conclusion. We must find a
positive solution. The thing is not easy. The difficulties have arisen
from the fact that we have tried to put into a single category all the
cases in which there is a concurrence of wills without the existence of
a contract.
If we proceed to a more thorough analysis we perceive that a dis-
tinction must be made between the cases in which the concurrence of
wills is only the sum total of unilateral declarations of wills, and those
in which the legal relation is created by the unilateral will of the
parties. In this case alone the expression collective act (in German,
Gesammtakt), the word designating a plurality of unilateral acts,
should be used.
In certain cases, on the other hand, there is clearly a concurrence of
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wills, a bilateral act, an agreement, if you like; but there is no contract.
We have here a juridical act of a specific nature which is neither a
contract nor a unilateral act. Jellinek and Triepel have given it the
name of Vereinbarung, of which the French and English word "union"
is the literal translation and which I propose to accept.
It is not my intention to study and to analyze all the instances in
public and private law in which the collective act or union appears.
That would far exceed the dimensions of an article for this JOURNAL.
I shall content myself with studying the collective act and the union in
the domain of private law, taking two characteristic examples-the
formation of associations and the collective labor agreement.
2
II
THE TRADITIONAL NOTION OF A CONTRACT
The principal point is to determine exactly what a contract is. Not-
withstanding the controversies which exist on the point, the thing is
not very difficult. We must not forget that the contract is a creation
of the Roman law which accords with a juridical system that is essen-
tially subjective and individualistic. The Roman conception of a con-
tract is materalized in the form of a stipulatio, a mold into which
every contract could be put.
Gaius has told us: "Verbis obligatio contrahitur ex interrogatione et
responsu, cum quid dari fierive nobis stipulamur"3  Verbis obligatio
fit ex interrogatione et responsione velut: Dari spondes? Spondeo.
'For twenty-five years the question has given rise to an extensive literature
in Germany and in Italy. I regret to say that the same is not true in France.
I believe the great German jurist Gierke was the first to show that it was a com-
plete mistake to see a contract in the constitutive act of an association or
corporation-Gierke, Die Genossenschaftstheorie (I887) 133. Jellinek has shown
that there are many cases in public law in which there is a concurrence of wills
without the existence of a contract. He considers that there is in this case a
juridical act possessing a specific characteristic which distingilishes it from the
unilateral act and the contractual act, a juridical act which he calls Vereinba-
rung.-Jellinek, System der Offentlichen subjektiven Rechte (1892) 193, 194.
In 1899, Triepel developed and made more specific this distinction between con-
tract and Vereinbarung. He saw in Vereinbarung the basis of objective
international law.-Triepel, V76lkerrecht und Linderrecht (i899). A complete
bibliography will be found in the thesis of Gleitsmann, Vereinbarung und
Gesammtakt (Halle, igoo).
The question has been much studied in Italy, especially by Borsi, L'atto
amministrativo complesso, in 2o Studi senesi (1902); Donato-Donati, Atto
complesso, in 12 Archivio juridico (i903).
In France the question has been studied but little. See, however, B6in,
Expos6 des doctrines allemandes et italiennes sur l'acte complexe, in Recueil de
legislation de Toulouse (i9o5) 289; Hauriou, Pr.incipes de droit public (2d ed.
1916) 136 et seq.
' Digest XLI, 7, I, § 7; Institutes III, 15.
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This form shows clearly two wills which are manifested outwardly-
two declarations of will, to use the modem expression, two wills which
have come into contact. There are two individuals who knowingly
agree and bind themselves, one stating that he stipulates, that is, that
he wills to become a creditor, the other stating that he promises, that
is, that he wills to become a debtor.4 The one who wills to become
creditor does so because he thinks that the other wills to become
debtor; the other who wills to become debtor does so because he
knows that the other wills to become creditor. The two wills concur
but each has its own objects and aims.
Thus there is formed a legal tie between two persons whose situa-
tion and interests are opposed: one is bound to effect a certain
"prestation" or "performance" 5 with respect to the other, who in turn
has the power to demand that performance.
A juridical act is a contract only if it can enter into the mold of such
a contract as the stipulatio. I want to say that a contract exists only
if the clauses of a juridical act, however complex we may assume them
to be, may enter into the framework of one or more stipulationes. If
they do not, something other than a contract exists: it may be an
agreement, but it is not a contract.
This Roman conception of a contract has been transmitted to the
modem law through the agency of the great Romanists of the Middle
Ages and of the Renaissance, by the great French jurists of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, and especially by Pothier. It is to-day
expressed in all the codes of Europe and America.
Pothier defined a contract as an agreement by which the two parties
reciprocally (or only one of them) promise and bind themselves with
respect to the other to give him something. Virtually the same defini-
tion may be found in the Code Napol6on: "A contract is an agreement
by which one or several persons bind themselves with respect to
another or several others to give, to do, or not to do a certain thing."8
The German Civil Code does not give a definition, properly so called,
of a contract (Vertrag). But it clearly appears from different articles
that it has maintained intact the traditional Roman notion of a con-
tract. It should be noted in the first place that the German Code uses
the word Vertrag only when the question concerns the creation, extinc-
tion, or assignment of an obligation. When the question concerns the
" "By the term 'creditors' is meant not only those who have loaned money, but
all to whom something is owing for any reason." Digest of Justinian, L. i6, xi.
Similarly in modern continental law the party obligated is called debtor and
the party entitled to a "performance" is called creditor.--[Translator.]
"Prestation-in German, Leistung-is the general term describing an act or
forbearance which one person is entitled to claim from the other by reason of an
obligatory relation existing between them. Schuster translates the term by the
word "performance:" The Principles of German Civil Law, 137.-[Translator.]'Art. iio.
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creation or assignment of a right in a res it uses the word Einigung.
The German Civil Code says :7 "A contract is concluded by the accept-
ance of an offer . . ." And in another place :8 "For the creation of an
obligation by juristic act, and for any alteration of the substance of
an obligation, a contract between the parties is necessary, unless it is
otherwise provided by law." Thus a contract exists only when an offer
has been accepted with the object of creating an obligatory relation-
ship-that is, a relationship of creditor and debtor between the offeror
and the acceptor.
The same conception is clearly formulated in the codes of the New
World. I shall refer to only three by way of example. The Civil Code
of the Argentine Republic, drafted between I868 and 187o by the
eminent Argentine jurist Dalmacio Velez-Sassfield, contains a clear
expression of the traditional notion of a contract. It is placed under
the title: Obligations which Arise out of Contracts. The characteristic
of a contract is thus the creation of an obligation between the contract-
ing parties. The agreement is formed by the offer of one of the parties
and its acceptance by the other.9 In the Civil Code of Louisiana there
is a definition of contract copied from that of the Code Napoleon :10
"A contract is an agreement, by which one person obligates himself to
another, to give, to do or permit, or not to do something, expressed or
implied by such agreement." An almost identical definition is found
in the Civil Code of Georgia :"' "A contract is an agreement between
two or more parties for the doing or not doing of some specified
thing."
Such is the notion of a contract which is unanimously admitted by
the civilians of all countries. It would serve no good object to repro-
duce the different definitions given, all of which turn on the same
point, and I shall content myself with citing a passage borrowed from
the classical work of Aubry and Rau, the reputation of which is uni-
versal :12 "An agreement is the accord between two or more persons
with respect to an object of juridical interest. The agreement which
has for its object the formation of an obligation is called more particu-
larly a contract. The agreement is the genus; the contract, the
species."
A contract is therefore a juridical act whose specific character is
clearly determined. It is created by the declarations of will proceed-
ing from two individuals or two groups of individuals and implying a
preliminary accord. Each of these declarations of will has an object
of its own; each has an aim of its own because it is determined by the
?Art 151.
SArt 305.
'Argentine Civil Code, arts. 117I, 1172, 178.
" Art. 1761.
"1 (Adopted Aug. 15, igio) art. 4216.
'4 Cours de droit civil francais, 283.
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other. The act as a whole has for its object the creation of a situation
uniting two persons or two groups of persons between whom exists
the relation of creditor and debtor.
3 In the situation which aises
from a contract there are always two persons and only two persons-
or two groups of persons. All the persons of the same group are in
the same situation with respect to those of the other group, and each
person or each group of persons is in a different situation and has
opposing interests, one being creditor, the other being debtor, each
having so willed.
Finally, a contract is an accord entered into between two persons
having for their object the creation of an obligation atthe expense of
one-the debtor, and for the benefit of the other-the creditor.
The notion of obligation and that of contract are thus intimately
related. An obligation may arise otherwise than from a contract. A
contract is the cause and the obligation the effect. But it is none the
less true that an act which does not have for its object the creation of
an obligation is not a contract. For this reason the Code Napoleon
and other codes include under the title of Contracts or Obligations
Arising from Agreement in General, dispositions relating to obliga-
tions and to contracts. This is certainly a bad method, but the explana-
tion is historical and discloses the intimate relation existing between
the notions of contract and obligation.
The above being established, it follows that there may be a concur-
rence of wills without there being a contract; that no contract exists
when there are several declarations of wills which have the same
object; that there is no contract, although there is an agreement, when-
ever the object of the parties is the creation of a situation which does
not constitute a relationship of creditor and debtor.
What have we then when there is no contract? I shall try to show
this. But it matters little: the principal thing is to assert that there
is no contract and that the application of the ordinary law of contracts
in such a case would involve a false view which would lead to grave
mistakes.
III
PLURALITY OF UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS OF WILL-THE ASSOCIATION
Practical modem needs and the great development of commerce and
industry have given rise to juridical formations which are called cor-
porations (sociftis anonymes) and associations. They have essentially
the same characteristics: the uniting of capital and labor for the attain-
ment of a certain end, which we assume to be lawful, in conformity to
a rule accepted by the members and constituting what are called the
articles of association.
I See note 4, supra.
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French law, in consequence of historical circumstances which we
need not here explain, distinguishes clearly between corporations and
associations according to a criterion which is in reality a purely formal
one. A corporation is a uniting of capital and labor for the attain-
ment of a purpose lucrative to its members. An association is the
union of capital and labor for the attainment of a non-lucrative pur-
pose for the benefit of its members or for the benefit of persons who
are not members of the association."4
I shall take as an example the association as just defined. The
French legislator who has neglected to make even a superficial analysis
of this act has seen therein a contract and has stated in the aforesaid
text that the association should be governed by the general principles
of law applicable to contracts and obligations. This is clearly an error
which will lead to regrettable consequences. In order to show this we
must distinguish between the preparatory period and the formation,
properly so called, of the association.
During the preparatory period those who promote the association
agree upon the manner in which it shall be created, on the contribu-
tions of each of them and upon the role which each is to play in the
association. That true contracts are thus made cannot be doubted.
There are agreements, accords between persons who intend to bind
themselves one to another.
These agreements may also contain stipulations for the benefit of
others which are valid as the condition of a contract which the parties
have made on their own behalf, and which have such force as the laws
of most countries attribute to them, such laws differing somewhat in
detail.
The above are contracts according to the traditional conception and
they have the traditional force. But none of these acts, however definite
and developed we may assume it to be, constitutes an association. So
long as there are only these acts there is no association as yet, and even
the effects of these acts are subordinate to the suspensive or resolutory
condition, according to the intention of the parties, that the association
shall be formed. The formation of the association is therefore dis-
tinct from such acts and is an entirely different thing.
When the above understanding has been reached the promotors of
the association make an appeal to the public. On the day and at the
hour announced the persons responding to the appeal assemble. The
promotors have drawn up articles of association-rules and provisions
of a general nature which contain five things: First, the object of the
association; second, its name; third, its home office; fourth, the
composition of the organization which is to administer its affairs; and
fifth, nearly always, the amount of the annual contributions which are
to be paid by the members. These propositions are discussed at the
"French Law of July i, IgoI, art. I.
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meeting; the proposed rules are then adopted and the articles ate
approved.
The association is thus formed and it includes as members all
those who have approved the articles. That is the constitutive act.
That there is a concurrence of wills is unquestionable; that there is
a plurality of declarations of concurring wills, there is no doubt. But
certainly there is no contract.
In the first place, there has been no contact between the different
wills that approved the articles of association. One of them has not
made an offer to another which has been accepted. The different per-
sons who were found in the hall did not in reality enter into relations
one with another. They have not exchanged promises with the object
of creating between themselves an obligation, a relationship of creditor
and debtor. One of them has not willed to bind himself, influenced
by the will of the other to become creditor, and vice versa. On the
contrary, all these persons intended the same thing: the formation of
an association according to the articles which they have approved. All
these declarations of will have been determined by the same end,
namely, the one which the articles that have been approved give to the
association.
After the association is formed, does there exist an individual
relationship of creditor and debtor between its members? Not at all.
There is a permanent situation, regulated by the articles of associa-
tion, which are really a law for the group-a law which applies not
only to the members, not only to the agencies of the association, but
also to third parties who enter into relations with these agencies.
The articles are the permanent law governing the members so long
as they remain in the association. They impose obligations, the most
usual of which is that of paying an annual contribution. A member
may be regarded in this respect as the debtor of the association, which
in turn is his creditor. But if the relation of creditor and debtor
exists between the association and its members, it by no means arises
from a contract between the members of the association, which is
anterior to the approval of the articles, since the association did not
exist at that time. Moreover, if the member is a debtor of the associa-
tion, he has become debtor by virtue of law. He is in a situation
analogous to that of a taxpayer, the amount of whose debt may be
increased by law in spite of himself. The amount of the contribution
may be increased by the majority in conformity to the articles, and
the dissenting members will have to submit to this act of the majority
just as the taxpayer must submit to an increase of taxes determined by
the law. This could not be so if there was a contract.
The articles apply to the members, who may be placed under what
is really a penal law-a disciplinary law. They may actually inflict
punishments and establish an agency of. the association which, like a
real court, shall pronounce them. The member can do nothing which
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constitutes a direct or an indirect injury to the aims of the association,
which interferes with its activity, or stains its reputation. Every act
of this kind constitutes a disciplinary infraction which the articles
may provide against and punish by a fine or by exclusion from the
association. The last constitutes the gravest punishment that can be
inflicted. There are numerous associations in which this is done. We
have thus a penal or disciplinary r6gime which leads us far away from
a contract; a well-defined juridical act which creates a relation-
ship of creditor and debtor between t*o juristic subjects.
The articles also apply to third parties. All dealings with third
parties in the name of the association are governed by the articles,
whioh may be invoked by those parties just as they may be invoked
against them. These articles determine the capacity and the powers
of the agencies of the association, and if the latter have done acts
beyond their authority, the nullity of those acts may be invoked by the
third parties just as it may be invoked against them.
The articles of association determine its object. Its agencies can
act only in conformity with its object; every act done in violation of
this object is null and void. Foreover, this nullity, which has as its
basis the articles of association, may be invoked against third parties
as well as by them.
May we say that the validity of a contract with third parties may be
determined by another contract? This would be absolutely contradic-
tory to the notion of a contract itself: a contract can change the legal
relations only of the contracting parties. On the contrary, everything
is explained and becomes luminously clear if we understand that the
approval of the articles has been equivalent to the voluntary establish-
ment of a law which is to govern the life of a new group.
Thus there arises the question indicated at the beginning of this
article. Does this concurrence of wills which forms the association
constitute a juridical act of a specific nature which distinguishes it at
the same time from a contractual act and from a unilateral act? Is it
a Vereinbarung-a union? I do not think so and I believe that there
is simply a plurality of unilateral declarations of will, a plurality of
unilateral acts; the validity of those acts is recognized by law because
they are aimed at a lawful object. This results from the analysis
which precedes.
Because of the celebrity of its author, I cannot pass by in silence
Gierke's view according to which the constitutive act of an association
has a specific character which distinguishes it from a contract and from
a unilateral act. Gierke teaches that the constitutive act of an associa-
tion is not simply a plurality of unilateral declarations of wills, because
these wills do not remain isolated without contact .among themselves,
but on the contrary they all contribute to a common end and become
fused in a common life. There is no contract because a contract con-
trasts two opposite wills-two wills which are bound by an agreement
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but which preserve their autonomy and play opposite roles in the situa-
tion which arises from the contract. In the present case, however, the
wills are associated and are by no means opposed one to the other;
they co-operate toward the same object; they tend to be merged and
to be lost in a single new will which is the will of the association that
has been formed.
"The act whereby the group is formed," writes Gierke, "is not a
contract but a unilateral collective act which has no parallel in the law
pertaining to the individual. The word contract of association is as
inexact as regards the formation of a group as it is for the organiza-
tion of a state or of a church and it can be accepted no more in private
law than in public law. It is the will of the collective being in the
process of formation which is developing and taking on form in order
to assert itself in the constitutive act. In consequence the development
of an association from its conception to its complete formation must
be considered as one act. The innumerable individual acts which take
place are comprehended as non-autonomous elements in the collective
act, set in motion by a single centre. In consequence this collective act
is already corporate action.1
15
It is impossible for me to follow the German jurist upon this ground.
This is not tbe place to discuss the celebrated question of the juridical
personality of collective bodies, a theory of which the Berlin professor
has made himself the apostle. It must suffice to say that this concep-
tion of a purely metaphysical nature must in my opinion be rejected
from every truly scientific theory of the law. It is the persistence of
the scholastic concepts of substance and entities which are without
value and of which jurisprudence should be rid once for all.
Gierke's negative proposition, "The act whereby the group is formed
is not a contract," is fully established. I believe I have proved it. But
we must not go further. A jurist should affirm nothing beyond what
he finds in reality. In the present case we see as a matter of fact a
certain number of individuals who approve articles because they desire
to pursue in common a lawful object in conformity to those articles.
It is neither a contract nor a Vereinbarung. There are several uni-
lateral declarations of will which create objective law for a group
pursuing an object recognized as lawful by the law of a given
country.
IV
THE COLLECTIVE LABOR CONTRACT
The term "collective labor contract" has been used to describe the
arrangements that have been brought about by the necessity of finding
a solution for the conflicts which have arisen in all countries between
Gierke, Die Genossenschaftstheorie (1887) 135.
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labor and capital. The expression is bad. The two words contract
and collective are contradictory, and the act which is thus designated
is neither a contract nor a labor contract. That there is a concurrence
of wills is unquestionable. It must even be admitted that there is an
agreement, a fact which distinguishes it from the case considered
above. But it must be unquestionably denied that there is a contract.
We use the term collective labor contract to describe the arrange-
ment commonly entered into between representatives of capital and
labor in a certain trade for the purpose of preventing or putting an
end to a strike; an arrangement regulating the conditions upon which
workmen in the trade shall thereafter be hired-such conditions, for
example, as the hours of labor and the scale of wages. In simpler
terms: the collective labor contract is an agreement which deter-
mines the law according to which individual labor contracts in a given
trade shall be concluded.
By way of example, we may consider the arrangement entered into
on February 7th, 1913, between the employers' association of bakers of
Bordeaux and the bakers' labor union, fixing the daily wages and the
conditions upon which employees might be dismissed by their
employers; or, to take another example, the arrangement entered into
in Paris on-October 4th, 1917, between the association of employers in
the artificial flower and feather industry, and the corresponding labor
union. This arrangement determined the conditions for the application
of the English week, and compensation for the higher cost of living.
We cannot fail to see that these acts constitute an agreement. The
representatives of the employers and those of the employees in the
trade have entered into contact; an accord has taken place. But this
agreement is not a contract. It is not a contract whether considered in
itself or from the point of view of the situation which arises there-
from. In a contract each contracting party wills a different thing and
aims at a different object. In the present case both parties will the
same thing: the creation of a general, permanent rule, of a law which
shall henceforth control the conditions of work in their trade. The
parties have the same object in view, namely, to avoid a conflict or
to resolve one which has arisen between the employers and employees
of a particular trade and to establish the law for their future relations.
As to the situation which arises from the collective labor contract,
is it possible to see therein upon any basis whatever a- relationship of
creditor and debtor, an obligatory relationship between one person who
is under a duty to render a certain performance and another who has
the right to demand it? There is simply a general, permanent rule, a
law according to which the individual contracts in the trade shall be
made, each of the contracting parties having the power to rescind an
agreement which may have been entered into contrary to the rule estab-
lished by the collective contract.
The jurists adhering to tradition have indeed been obliged to
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recognize that the collective contract did not give rise to true obliga-
tions between the contracting groups, and that if obligations did arise
they resulted from the duty of the employers and employees to con-
clude individual labor contracts in conformity with the general rules
established by the collective act. But these jurists have been con-
siderably embarrassed to explain how these obligations could arise.
At first they have tried to explain the matter as a stipulation for the
benefit of others which is provided for by Article 1121 of the Code
Napol6on and in similar provisions of many other codes. It may be
lawfully stipulated in a contract that the debtor, in addition to what
he promises to the other contracting party, shall render a certain per-
formance for the benefit of a third party, and even for the benefit
of a person who shall be determined subsequently by an act which is
quite independent of the will of the contracting parties. But in order
that there may be a stipulation for the benefit of another it is neces-
sary that a promise for the benefit of a third party be made and con-
sented to in fact. In the collective contract there is nothing of the
kind. The contracting unions do not agree that one of them
shall render a certain performance to a third party, whether deter-
mined or not. A general, permanent rule has been established by
which the individual contracts in the trade shall be regulated between
employees and employers, between workmen and capitalists. How-
ever much we may search, no trace of a contract for the benefit of
another can be found.
They have been obliged to admit the foregoing facts. They have
then wanted to bring in the idea of mandate. The learned members
of the Soci 6t des 6tudes l~gislatives proceeded thus in 19o7, when
they tried to draft a law on the subject of collective labor contracts.' 6
In this mandate, however, the mandataries are the union and the
association; the mandants are the individuals who comprise the union
and the association at the time the collective agreement is made.
Under these conditions the terms of the agreement are binding neither
upon the employees nor upon the employers who were not respectively
members of the union and of the association at the time of the agree-
ment, nor upon those who withdraw therefrom subsequently, because
in so retiring, they revoke the supposed mandate which they have
given to their organizations. One might as well say, then, that the
collective contract is without effect because the employers who are
members of the association may always hire workmen who are not
members of the union upon conditions which seem best to them, and
because the employers merely have to withdraw from the association
in order to be able to make such contracts as they please. A collective
contract thus understood is a nonentity.
6 Bulletin de la socifti des tudes l~gislatives, 19o7, pp. 18o, 505; Report of M.
Colson and discussion, ibid. p. 532 et seq.; ibid. r9o8, p. 82 et seq.
COLLECTIVE ACTS
This leads us to the conclusion, that what is called a collective labor
contract is a very specific juridical category which is neither a plurality
of unilateral acts nor a contract in the proper sense of the word.
There is a concurrence of wills; there is an agreement between two
groups which preserve their autonomy. But there is no contract
because the object and the aim of the declarations of will are the same
for all parties. Their wills have not as their object the creation of a
situation of creditor and debtor; the object is to establish a general,
permanent rule according to which labor contracts in the trade are to
be made. These wills are determined by the same aim-to regulate
or to prevent a conflict between employers and employees.
The collective labor contract is an agreement or law regulating the
relations of two social classes. It is by no means a contract giving rise
to special, concrete and temporary obligations between two juristic sub-
jects. It is a law establishing permanent relationships between two
social groups, the legal rule according to which the individual contracts
between members of these two groups are to be concluded. Just as
the articles of association are the law for a group, in the same way the
clauses of a collective contract are the law which governs the relations
between two social groups.
On July 29, 1913, the French Chamber of Deputies approved a bill
on the subject of the collective contract which is based directly upon
these ideas. The text wrongly retains the expression "contract,"
although the title of the law is "The collective labor agreement." In
article I, section 2, it is correctly stated that this agreement "deter-
mines the conditions which individual labor contracts must satisfy."
The bill stipulates that all members of the groups that are parties to
the collective labor agreement or that subsequently assent thereto are
bound by it, provided they have not resigned from the group within the
space of a week. Each group that is a party to a collective labor agree-
ment made for an indeterminate duration may at any moment denounce
it. This is logical, inasmuch as a law should always be subject to
modification-even a law by agreement. But the law permits each
member of a group that is a party to a collective labor agreement,
unless he has surrendered such privilege, to free himself from the
obligations resulting from that agreement by withdrawing from the
group of which he was a member at the time the agreement was entered
into; and he cannot surrender for a period of more than five years this
privilege of freeing himself from an agreement which is in operation.
The provisions of the law do not well agree with the general notion
of a collective labor agreement. We see therein a persistence of the
individualistic conception of a contract of which the legislator has not
been able to free himself completely and which threatens, if the law
is definitely approved in these terms, to compromise its effectiveness.
On the other hand, it was evidently with some difficulty that the legis-
lator could be made to admit that the members of contracting unions
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could not by withdrawing from the union always get rid of the law
which the collective contract had created.
The truth is that although collective labor contracts have multiplied,
especially since the war began, the time has not yet come for legisla-
tive action. We have here an institution which is still in the process
of formation and is far from its complete development. The working
classes have not yet acquired a definite juridical structure,; in each
trade, such strong and widespread labor unions and employees' asso-
ciations do not exist that they may be regarded as identical with
the trade; the laborers and employers outside such unions and
associations may not be considered as negligible quantities.
I believe that many of the European countries-and especially France
-are tendingtoward this social state. Far from being arrested by the
war, the evolution has rather been accentuated and has become more
distinct. The employers' associations have a well-established organi-
zation in many trades. The evolution has perhaps advanced less so far
as the labor unions are concerned, but that does not prevent the effec-
tiveness and the sanction of the collective labor contract. Its provi-
sions have for their special object the protection of the workman so far
as salary and the maximum of daily work are concerned. When the
employers' association has accepted the provisions of a collective labor
contract, if this association constitutes in fact the organized trade, the
agreement really becomes the law of the trade, and every workman,
even if not a member of the union, should be able to invoke the appli-
cation of that law.
V
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis which I have just made of the collective labor contract
may be made with respect to many acts of private and public law which
are agreements but not contracts, which do not create a relationship of
obligations at all, but form the conditions for the application of a law
to certain persons, or establish a rule of law in the substantive sense.
In private law marriage is an act of this kind. It is not a contract
strictly speaking. It is an agreement which is the condition for the
application to the husband and wife of the law concerning the status
of married people. In public law the appointment of public officers
is an act of the same kind. It is difficult to say that there is no agree-
ment between the state which appoints and the officer who is appointed;
but this agreement is not a contract. The relationship of creditor and
debtor is not created between the state and the public officer. A juristic
situation is created; and the appointment is the condition for the appli-
cation to the public officer who is appointed of the law concerning the
public office in question.
COLLECTIVE ACTS
The same juridical phenomenon appears in public law in the granting
of a franchise for a public service. An understanding, an agreement,
is made between the state or municipality and the grantee, and this
understanding constitutes the law which governs the operation of the
public service in question. We would be outside of the actual facts,
we would arrive at consequences that are absolutely untenable, if we
should see in the granting of a franchise for a public service a contract
and apply the ordinary law thereto. The difficulties and controversies
which have arisen in France during the war between cities and cor-
porations which hold franchises for public services have for their
cause in great measure this. mistake in the point of view.
In international law many treaties have the same character. Their
object is by no means the creation of reciprocal obligations between the
contracting states, but the establishment of a law regulating inter-
national relations in a permanent manner-a law which is very fragile,
it is true, as the terrible events which the world is witnessing is show-
ing only too plainly. But a crime never proves that the criminal law
doesnot exist. The crimes of Germany do not prove that there are
no laws founded upon international treaties or laws which are binding
upon states.
At the beginning of this study I put the following questions: Are
there cases where there is a concurrence of wills without a contract?
In the cases where there is a concurrence of wills without a contract, is
there a juridical act of a specific character which is neither a unilateral
act nor a contractual act?
To the first question I answer: Yes, there are numerous acts where
there is a concurrence of wills without a contract. The second question
I answer by making a distinction. Frequently in connection with a
concurrence of wills there is by no means a true juridical act; there is
simply a plurality of unilateral declarations, a number of unilateral acts.
We may call this concurrence of unilateral acts a collective act, a
Gesammtakt according to the German expression. But it must be
clearly understood that there are simply a number of unilateral acts, the
sum total of which are the conditions for the creation of a certain legal
situation and especially for the creation of a collective group and of
the law which governs it.
In the other cases, on the contrary, the concurrence of wills does
constitute an agreement, but the agreement is not a contract. There
the concurrence of wills forms a specific juridical act which is neither
a unilateral act nor a contractual act. It is what the Germans call
Vereinbarung and which I propose to call union. A typical example
is the collective labor agreement, as I have tried to show. Such an
agreement really constitutes a law which regulates the relations of two
or more groups. In other cases the act of union is the condition for
the application of a general law to certain persons, as husband and
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wife, or public officers; or it constitutes the law governing the
franchise for a public service; or it establishes a rule of international
law. The application of the union in public law as well as in private
law is therefore wide, and it is bound to grow with the general move-
ment which I have elsewhere tried to put into relief,17 which has become
accentuated during the war, and which develops the law governing
modem associations more and more in a socialistic and objective
manner.
' See my two works, Les transformations ginirales du droit privi depuis le
code Napolion (Paris, 1912) and Les transformations du droit public (Paris,
1913).
